Representing the Holocaust remains an important political task. It must continue to be done because of the constant danger of forgetting, ignoring, or consigning the event to an irrelevant history. For these same reasons, the way we represent the Holocaust is more important than the mere fact that we do so, and no congratulations are required of any work that shows a concentration camp on screen or stage, or in prose or verse. Instead, what is required is critical interrogation—how does this representation refresh and re-imagine, and in so doing re-enliven the Holocaust for a generation that wants to make the Holocaust into a melodrama, a sad story told in order to reframe the sacrifice of the Jews as a necessary sacrifice for the betterment of mankind. They had to die in order for us to learn never to do that again. It is this fundamental position that must be guarded against, carefully and systematically, with each new “go” at representation.
This is true because all aesthetic representation, and by extension all acts of theatrical creation and reception, are acts of reconstruction. They are intensified refractions of the very processes by which meaning is made every day of our lives—with every shape we pull out of the darkness, we make possible knowledge and political change, and we do this through the violence of making impossible other shapes and other knowledges. We gain only by losing. What saves meaning is its necessary incompletion, and it is this incompletion that is underlined by the social frame of the aesthetic. Because every interpretation, every ounce of knowledge, is available to deconstruction and critique, there is always the possibility for new knowledge. But in the “everyday” world—the world we pretend has nothing to do with theater—we carry forward with the belief that what we know is true, is not subjective and transcendental and, if not eternal, at least “the way things are today.” When we doubt, we go to art. When we want nothing to do with doubt, we go to science. And when we are sick of doubt but know we can’t be rid of it forever, and so need to manage it in some way, we go to philosophy and critical analysis. Religion participates, at various times, in all three categories of experience, though the boundaries among them are nonetheless reinforced by each instance of relation with religion.
The guest I saw Kamp with was frustrated by the piece because, as he said, “it left me cold.” He wanted a greater emotional pay-off for the time he spent in the theatre, though he was quick to admit he did not want “the tears of Schindler’s List,” but he did want an emotional release or catharsis or arc of some kind. He wanted, again in his own words, an experience that was “not merely intellectual.” This policed boundary between intellection and emotion is indicative of a common misconception of the role that art has to play in human cultures. It is to assume, falsely, that ideas cannot pleasure, or hurt.
And it is not ugly or evil. It is banal. And it was designed and constructed. And it can be torn down. And it can be rebuilt differently. And as the sun set on one day in the life of the camp, with no sound of liberators in the distance, and no proffered “hope” or emotional release for the spectator, not even the consolation of a resilient human spirit that “cannot be destroyed,” nor of a moral superiority for those of us watching (all these constructions only serve to make the camps less dangerous)—we are left with the disturbing and also empowering image of a work of art (the camp) rendered as a work of art (Kamp), and therefore no longer finished, but forever incomplete.
Note: This post is unedited. I guess that's the point, right?
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